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DIS"ENTIITG OPINION
It Is a matter of deep regret to me that I em un
able to agree with my a.ssooiatep in all that is determined
in the Opinion and Judgment filed herein. That was indicated
when I signed it with reservations. One who disassociates
himself from a substantial part of an Oplnien and Judgment is'
under some oblig^^tion, it seems to me, to state the reasons.
Th^t is my present purpose.
The limited time available does not permit me to
indulge in elaboration, or ,to mention all the points of dif
ference with the Opinion. X must be content, therefore, in '
indicating in broad outline those differences of view which •
seem te me to be of major importance, g»me ureliminary oTb-
servptions by "ay ®f background for ^uch discussion may be
helpful.
The evidence in this case is not in sulBStantial
conflict, so far as it rel^^tes to the vital evidentiary facts.
For the most part, in spite of some difference in coloration,
-1-
rthe evidence for the Defens:e rounds cut and Fupplements the
picture given hy the prosecution. The divergence of ^pinion
of the Tribunal arises chiefly from a difference of view as
to the interpretation of the evidence, and particularly as
to what inferences may properly be drawn therefr»m and as to
what facts mu't necessarily be shown to constitute guilt of
a particular crime, and the degree of proof with which it
must be established-
These matters will not be treated separately, or
in order, but my position, with reference to all of them, will
be expressed or illustrated in the course of this separate
Opinion.
It seems to me important also that we should re
fresh our recollection °s to some of the rights of an accused
and some dangers which mu^t be guarded again't to insure
Just verdict, and that will be di'cussed also.
Beginning with the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal decided-unSer the London Charter, and run
ning through all the deolaions of subsequent trlbunsle at
Nurnberg, vhlch were decided under Control Law 10, of v.hl
the London Charter 1' made a part, the following propositions
are clearly dl^-cernlble;
1. That guilt Is peif-onal end Individual and mu. t
t. »...a on tn. p.r~.sl .Oto of tM InOlfiao.l oK.rg.a
not oonotruouv. o, ooUeotlv. -o Mo. th. ofl.l..! •'
slon .»a .0 ooatrol o,.r tnoo. -no aia 00-1. t„...
3 Tl... M «»'" " """ """
.not .0. l.ai^iao.i a,„.a,n.
n., . .00..1 —"" •
-E-
I-V.
have performed it vjith the intention of committing a crime,
^^uoh act may be an act of omieaion where there is a duty to
act and power to prevent. Crimea, generally rpeahing, are
intentional wrongs, the intentional re''ults of action or non-
action. They committed "wilfully ®nd knowingly as the In
dictment charges. They are not the result of accident or of
V
circumstances over which the actor had no control and no
reason to anticipate.
3. All the elements nece^j^ary to establish the per
sonal guilt of the individual charged must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
This last proposition means that the burden is on
the "Prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendant, in
acGorc^ance with the preceding propo.^itions, by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. It means th^=t in the meantime he is'pre
sumed to be innocent, and th^t such presumption stands as a
witness for him throughout the trial. It means th^^t all the
material evicience must be co.n'"idered and if from the credible
evidence two inferences may be drawn, one of guilt and one
of innecenoe, the latter must prevail. It means that where
circumstances are relied up»n to establish guilt, the cir-
oumstances must be so complete ©s to exclude' any other reason
able hypothesis.
These propositions are not a mere ooll.eotion of words
to be repeatedj, given lip service, and then ignored. They are
basic. The ic'eas they repre'"ent mu" t be constantly kept in
mind if the rights of the accused are to be properly safeguarded
and the conviction of tho^e who m^y not have actually committed
the crime charged avoided. To ignore them end ^hat they require
of the Tribunal in the way of mental attitude at any stage of
-3-
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the pro-ce-e-dlngs ip to open the door to error and inju?'tice.
There ip a vest difference between evidence ^•^:hich proves a
• criine and th^t v hich confirmr a suspicion.
Unfortunately the Prosecution'? case as, for the
mostj part, not presented either in the evidence or in argu
ment in harmony with these propositions and the concept which
they represent. ' For example, evidence as to all the crimes
Gommitted by the Third Reich, and they were many and horrible,
has "been introduced before us in all their gory detail-s, in
cluding movies of conditions in ?ome concentration camps tak
en after Allied troops occupied the territory, although it
is not charged that ^ny defendant in this dock had ?=ny direct
connection with or reFponsibility for "ach conditions. It
is srgued thet the defendants are guilty of all these crimes
of which they received, knowledge, actual or constructive-
Much of the time of the trial was taken up with an effort to
prove -uoh knowledge, frequently by means of documents '.^hioh
are - hown to have reached their office. The theory is that
If ,a defendant knew of a crime anr '^Here in the government
and remained at hir po^t of duty, he thereby approved the
crime and became guilty of it. Of course, the s«me result
-would follow if 8 defendant by some document or otherwise took
H.P fBot that s crime had been committed unless
.cognizance of the oiient.
. he openly and vigorously protested against it. ..
Other statements of the Prosechtion are more frank
e.nd realistic. WitnesP the following from a prosecution Brief:
-unless we subscribe to the Preposterouscrime '^hould not be
fto^'foHf it committed by a.State,4-onP for P. Nation'^ crimesthose mu't atone i g ogenoies
pi""-"*"
+-v,4 riffle In febis case, includingThis may explain many thin^in thi.
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the fact that the men v^ho seem to have actually committed
war crimes "by their own testimony a'^pear in this case, not
in the dock, but as witnesres for the Prosecution.
These attitudes reflect impatience with the idea
that these defendants, as individuals, must be shown to
have personally committed crimes according to the usual and
customary standards or tests. They may also indicate a
realization that the evidence in many instances is insuf
ficient to establish guilt by such standards. The^ repre
sent a concept of mass or collective guilt, under which men
should be found guilty of a crime even though they knew
nothing about it v^hen it occurred, and it was committed by
people over whom they had no re• ponsibility or control.
The theory seems to be that this concept applies with special
emphasis when the defendants held prominent positions in the
government of Germany when the crimes v;ere committed.
There are other arguments advanced to sustain con
vlotions on a mass scale, wihich, in my judgment, are even
more unsound on legal grounds and more vicious in their con
sequences. But since the Opinion does not mention them,
reveal the psrt they played in the decision, I shall not
tempt to discuss them. It is sufficient to say that I re
ject them all. Since Conspiracy is^out of this case, no
sort of legal legerdemain can substitute for proof that
defendant as an individual committed some act either
sion or commission with the intent thereby to bring
result Which i-^ a crime charged in the indictment, and which
accomplished its purpose. If the evidence is insufficient
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basi- of
-5-
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f^uoh individual refponFibility, as distinguished from
group responsibility, this Tribunal has no other alterna
tive than to acquit.
' All of these arguments and contentions in behalf
of the T^rosecution lead by somevJhst different routes to a
very simple formula for determining guilt as follov;s: The
^ government of the Third peich committed many crimes; the
^ defendants held prominent positions in that government,
and knev) of some of the.se crimes, therefore, they ere
guilty. It smacks more of ^^omething el?e than a proceed
ing to fix the legel responsibility for crime.
It is strange doctrine and reasoning to be ad
vanced by lawyers representing Americen Justice, and the
American concept of crime. One excuse for it is that Con
trol Law 10 contains a provi^^ion that those are guilty of a
crime "who took a consenting part therein".
The phrase is interpreted to mean that by giving
consent to the crime after ,it was committed was to take a
conpentlng part, and that failure to either openly protest
or go on a sit-down strike in time of war, after receiving
knowledge that someliody somevhere in the government committed
a crime, was to consent to the crime and thereby become guil y
* of it. It makes proof easy'end guilt almost universal.
Frankly, it i' incredible to me that such a con
tention should be advanced, and more incredible that it
should receive seriou consideration. It is wholly unreal
iptic. It has neither reason nor a rudimentary conception
of juatice to sun ort it. It does not even give nroper ef
fect to the language used in the Control law, and has no
surmort so far as I have been able to ascertain in ay of
-6-
the deoisione here at Kurnberg. Properly aonstrued, this
phrase simply means that one- v'ho "took a consenting part",
must be one who took a part in the erime and the consent
must Play a part in the crime. This is the language of
the statutei Consent after the crime, if such a thing is
possible,' could not play s part in the crime. A failure
to openly object to a crime after it has been committed,
where there i- no right of objeotion, because of absence,
of jurisdiction in the matter, and where such objection
would, therefore, accomplish nothing, c.annot properly be
called "consent" at all, and even if failure to resign
under -ach circumstances after hearing about a crime can
•properly be called "consent" it could not play a V.fb ih
the crime. The phrase "take a consenting part" properly
construed is,not inconsistent with the idea of individual
responsibility for crimes. It is not inconsistent with
the idea that to constitute s crime there must he on the
part of the person charged'-some action or omission of duty
have a causal connection with the crime charged and under
taken with the intention of committing a crime. Any persoh
who can order a crime oomir.itted can consent to its commis
sion with equal effect and with equal responsibility.
TO take a consenting part means no more th-n that.
This is the only interpretation which makes sense.
It i^ the only interpretation which Is consistent with the
allegations of the Indictment that defendants committed
crimes "knowingly and wilfully". It the only interpreta
tion Which is consistent with e pre'um-.tion of innocence,
and that personal end individual guilt must be established
beyond p rraponable c'oubt.
•7-
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IMorebYer, Control Coancil Law 10 does not pro
vide thpt remaining in office after receiving knowledge
that someone in the gcvernment h^-s committed a crime, is
in itself a crime, and the Indictment makes no such charge-
it is not a crime and it does not in itself prove any other
crime. Nor can it properly "be allowed to sustain a. con
viction, or motivate a conviction on some other ground.
In order to comply with the letter and spirit of
what has been heretofore stated, we must put out of mind
entirely the fact that these defendants were recently mem
bers of a regime v.-hich we thoroughly disliked and with
which we were recently at war, and that >ome of them have
uttered offensive .sentiments against our country, its
leaders and its troops. Ve must put out of mind entirely
all the crimes of their compatriots in v-hich they took no
part. We must disregard all the evidence of such crimes
and the horrible details and pictures presented here in
connection therewith, all of which are inflammatory in
character and likely to arouse passion and prejudice.
The men in thi^ dock must be tried and judged on what they
did, and not on wh^^^t somebody else did. They must be tried
solely on the evidence relating to the particular crimes
charged against them. They must be judged on fair and im-
BPrtial consideration of "11 the evidence rel-ting to their
guilt, and not on the personal beliefs of members of the
Tribunal, which are not established by the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt. There must be no assumption on the part
of the Tribunal that it kno\«JS more about the facts than is
thus established by the evidence. Such detachment from all
of these irrelevant and inflemmatory matters, and oUch de
votion to the easentiais of a fair and proper tri.al must
be achieved, if justice is to be done.
-8-
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If there be those vjho reg^^rd ruch an approach
"v^'ith diefeyor, let them take cohort in the fact that it
repre'^ ents net only the lav; epnlic*=ble .to the yribunala, but
the ideal:- of ju-^tice of the people of the nation '^hich
sponsor? these trials, and .that a vast majority of those peo
ple Tould feel betrayed if convictions were b^^sed on any
le'^ser standard, ' '
Moreover, they should reflect on the fact that
If these trials have a reason for eyistence, it is to en
courage respect for the rules applicable to warfare. Suoh
encouragement comes quite as much in freeing from punish-
/ '
ment thoae who are not shown to have vdlfully, knowingly snd
with criminal intent violated these rules as it does in
puni^'hing those who h^ve so violated them. Any suggestion
of constructive or collective guilt, no matter how disguised,
would, of course, ^unish those who did not individually and
personp>lly violate the rules equ^illy with those vjho did,
and thuj^ destroy not only ^respect for the rules but also the
whole legitimate purpose of the trials.
Any other approach to these trials or purpose in
pursuing them could not h^ve respect for law and justice as
Its object.
- It has seemed to me not only proper but 'necessary
to refer in this separate Opinion to the arguments and con-
tentions in behalf of conviction hereinabove discussed be
cause of the light they may oast on many of the convictions
contained in the Tribunal's judgment; Many of these convip-
tlons are incomprehensible to me except as .viewed in the
light of such arguments and similar lines of reasoning. Un-
-9-
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fortunately the Opinion, long as it is, reveals little
of the process of legal reasoning which sustains the con
clusion.
There are other preliminary matters' which should
be briefly considered as an aid to a bettex' undex'standing
of the discussion of the law and the facts with referc>nc6
to some of the counts of the Indictment v/hich follow.
One thing which should be made unmistakably clear
at the outset is that this Tribunal is not a law-Liaking in
stitution. X violently disagree with the Opinion that we
are engaged in enforcing laternational law which has not
been codified, and that we nave an obligation to lay dov/n
rules of conduct for tne guidance of nations in the future.
Such a conception entirely misconstrues our function and
our power, and must inevitably lead to error of the gross
est sort, it is not for us to say what things should be
condemned as crimes and v/hat taings should not. That has
all been done by the law-making authority. Control haw 10
gives us jurisdiction only of three crimes which are de
scribed ther-^in, namely;
(IJ Grimes against leace.
(2) vvar Crimes, and
(5) Grimes against Humanity.
Crimes aoiainst Peace and Grimes against humanity
are defined by the Act. v«ar Crlrnos are defined in part by
the Act and in part as violations of the laws and customs of
war. Thero is no claim that there ar^ any laws and customs
of war applicable here except as contained in the Hague or
Geneva Conventions, or described in Control Law 10. Thus
a definition or description of all the ciimes for vhich wo
ai's authorized to convict has been reduced to writing for
our guidance.
.Ji-v,
Vi<«l
"^•^•le have no power to reach out and condemn and
puniah anything and everything which we may believe to
be wrong. Unles' the sots of a defendant are a crime
within the terms of a statute or rule, we have no author
ity to declare them a crime, in a case where the defend
ants are charged with violating these rules, we must be
careful not to violate them ourselves by declaring an act
to be 8 crime, which is not made a crime by these rules,
^ We are not enforcing uncodified international
law, and no one has been indicted here for violating an
^ uncodified rule of international law. vrhere a crime de
scribed in Control Law 10, purports to be a codification
of a pre-existing rule of internaticnal law, and a ques
tion of interpretation arises, we may properly look to the
rule as it existed before such codification as an aid to
the interpretation. Other than that, we have no concern
with uncodified international law.
Moreover, it must be realized that these rules
do not contain a complete code of laws which cover every
situation which may arise during warfare. Many acts which
we may regard as cruel and wrong, do not come within their
^ terms.
As profes'or V/echslar has said.
ttonoe the evil of war has been precipitated,
not?inrreLins but the fragile effort, em-for the mof^t pert in the convention to
St the cruelty by which it ie conducted, "
The legal qur-tion, therefore, for ua to determine
if not whether a particular act ought to be a crime but
whether it ia a crime under the rule'^ applicable here, al-
I
ays keeping in mind that ve have no right to extend thesew
-11-
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rules by constructioa.
It is the genera:, rule that statutes and rules
defining crivne inust be s trictly construed in favor ol the
accused. This means that questions involving doubtful
oonstrucbion should be resolved in favor of the accused.
Other questions will be considered as'they arise
in connection with the discussion of the convictions under
the several counts of tne Indictment, to whicn this separate
Opinion is directea,
i'-.y disagreement with the Judgment in this case
is limited to convictions wnlch I believe to be either un
warranted or exaggerated and which, in my opinion, are not
justified by the law or the facts. it will, tnerefore, be
necessary to discuss both the applicttble law and facts.
It wou^d serve no useful purpose and is obviously
impractical for me to discuss all the individual convictions
in all the counts •of the -ndictment'. i shall, therefore,
discuss In connection with bnc several counts, to which this
separate Opinion is directed, only such individual convic
tions as seem necessary to illustrate my separate view..
5'"
mm
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COUNT ONE
COUI^IT ONE charpies the defendants' therein named
of Crimes Against Peace",
''in that ti ey j^articii-ated. in tno initiation
er invasions of other coiintries and wars of
aggression in violation of international Laws
and Treaties including but not limited bo
planning, preparation, initiation and v/aglng
of •'"'ars of a g'T're ssion, ^nd vars in violation
of Tftternational Treaties, Agreements and
Assurances
The Opinion and Judgment of the Tribunal con
victs the defendants wEISSA.LCiP-h, KEPPLEK, bOEIiMANN,
lAlWiEhS and KOEKNER of this charge.
I am unable to agree v/ith this judgment.
Rather than attempting to point out the points of dis
agreement with the Opinion on this Count, it v/111 be-..
simpler to present my viev;s independent of the Opinion.
TilP API LI CABLE LAW
At the outset. It seems important that, v/e con
sider the la\v appxicaole to the situation. Not until
v/c know v;bat is necessary as a matter of law to con
stitute guilt, crn we intelligently consider the evi
dence bearing on the question. Unfortunately, wc arc
met nerc -with a surprising lack of clarity in the
decisions, end with some uncertainty, and an apparent
divergence.of view.
Some confusion appears to have resulted from
the discussion in the cases, and some of it from
holdings without adequate discussion of the legal
basis therefor, i shall attempt to set out in some
-13-
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detail, my own analysis of the legal situation and
my conclusions with reference thereto, and. tne rea
sons therefor,
Ihc law which is the basis of our authority
is Control Council Lcv.^ No. 10, >^ereinaftcr referred
to as "Law 10," enacted by the four occupyin.i^ pov/era,
on the 20th of December 1945. I'hat law is binding
upon us. It is the basis for the Jurisdiction of
this Tribunal, We have no power or Jurisdiction
with reference to any crime not described in that
lav;, and the description or definition of the crime
as contained in that lav; is binding on us.
Lav; 10 defines "'Crimes Ag.ainst Peace" in
Article II (a) as follows:
Crimes against Peace. Initiation of
invasions of other countries and wars of
aggression in violation or international
laws f.nd treaties, including out noe lim
ited to plc.nnint>, prt^paration, initiation
or waging a war of aggression, or a v;ar
of violation of international treaties,
a^rrc-ments or assT^rances, or participation
in a common plan or conspiracy for tho
rACComplishmcnt of any of the. foreo-oiner,"
Some questions of interpretation arise at the
outset. In the solution of these problems we must
look to the language of the Act primarily, and if
there is still uncertainty, we must look to the his
torical background In an effort to ari'ive at tho
true meaning.
It must be conceded that,while the Control
Council had power to enact any sort of lav; which it
desired, the obvious purpose was to provide machin
ery for the punishment of crimes which were thought
-14-
to be crimes under International Law existing at the
time, will be of some help in the matter of interpre
tation where it becomes necessary to resort to inter
pretation.
CAN THERE BE A CKIf/iE AGAINST PEACE VaTHOUT V/AR?
The first question which arises is whether or not
there can be a crime against peace within the meaning
^ of Law 10 where there is no war. This is important
for our consideration, because of the acts in Austria
and Czechoslovakia, where troops moved in and occupied
the country, but there was no war, and because of the
further fact that there are some convictions here
based on such actions. There are several matters
which need to be considered in arriving at a proper
solution of this question,
(1) In the first place, the London Charter,
which was adopted by the four occupying powers, and
which was the basis for the prosecution of the major
war criminals by the International Military Tribunal,
(hereinafter referred to as the makes no refer
ence to "invasions" but referred only to "wars".
Law 10 states that its purpose Is to give ef
fect to the London Charter, and by Its terms, the Lon
don Charter is made an integral part thereof. This
being true, the description of Crime against Peace
contained in the London Charter is also contained
in Law 10, and we thus have two descriptions
of the Crimes against Peace, and the problem of
-15-
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I'oconciiing them,
This te^sk must bo ^.p^ro-'Chod '• Itli the assumi.-tion
by Lav' 10 tbore v.rr-g no IntTition to substantially
alter or change the \def'im,tion of Crimes against Peace
as contained in the London Charter, and incorporated
in Law 10,
(2) iVioreover, the IMT held that the invasions of
Austria and Czechoslovakia were "aggressive acts,"'
but did not hold that they wore "aggressive wars."
(3) Law 10, by specifically referring to inva-
^ siona and aggressive wars, recognizes that they are
not the same thing, so that v/o cannot say thrt war
includes invasions«
(4) As previously pointed out, j-uw ±0 obviously
attempts -co provide machinery for tn^ punishment of
crimes vhich were thonyrt to be crimes prior to its
enactment. Some of the authors of the London Charter
•»
have declared that it did not create ''ny nc"* Crime
I against pcadc, but was merely a description or condi-
ficatlon of a crime against.peace, which existed
prior to its adoption.
^ The IMT took the same view, basing its conclu
sion for the most part upon the fact that some 63
I nations of the world had agreed to abolish vjar as an
instrument of national policy, In the Kcllogg-Briand
Pact, and some other Trertlca of the same general pur
port, feut such reasoning would apply only to wars,
because neither In the Kcliogg-brland iact, nor any
other Treaty, so far as I ar.i aware, is there any treaty
-16-
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or agreenent affecting the coimtries hare involved
with reference to i-nere invasions -- at least not
invasions accomplished under the circumstances under*
which -lustria and Czechoslovakia wor^ invaded. The
thing which is prohibited by all of these Treaties
is war. If we start with the premise that what was
intended was to describe crimes wh^ch wore already
crimes under International Law, wo will have to
excludo Invasions, because there was no possible
basis for claiming that a m^re invasion was contrary
to International uaw, prior to the enactment of Law
10,
(5} An analysis of the language of Lav; 10 and
its grammatical construction does not support the
contention that a mere invasion Is a violation of its
terms. ror oxamplo, it will be noticed that all oi •
th^ alternative acts vialch bhe -Sfcatut-j provides shall
each constitute the crime'arc separated by a comma,
and tho disjunctlvo word "or", whereas "Invasions of
'other countries" and "v;ars of aggression, etc." are
not separated but, on the contrary, are united by
the conjunctive word "and" whion, from a purely gram
matical standpoint, suggests thab both are necessary
to constitute the crime.
It has been suggested that such a construction
is unrealistic, because it would raean that, in order
for a war of aggression to be a crime against peace,
it would have to be acoompaniod by an invaslnn. But it
must be remembered that Law 10, in giving these Tribunals
jurisdiction over certain described crimes, does iiot
purport to describe comprehensively all of the crimes
-17-
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that may exist under International Law* Indeed it
restricts tnem and restricts our jurisdiction both
in time and in torritorv.
Thi is nothing inconsistent, therefore, for
haw 10 to limit our jurisdiction only to such crimes
against peace as involved an invasion, first, because
the invasion, coupled with the war, helps to emphasise
its aggressive character, and ordinarily constitutes
the best evidence that the war Is one of aggression;
and, second, because nearly all of the aggrossivo wars
with which we have to deal, did include Invasions.
Such a limitation contained in Law 10, has no
effect in limiting International Law generally, but
only limiting bbe particular t7fpe of crime with which
v/o are authorized to d-eal.
(O) In addition, some rather absurd results fol
low an Interprotatlon that invasions of other countries
alone, and without v/ar, constitute a crime against po&oe.
For instance, if wo regard them as separate crimes, that
is, if we regard invasions of other countries as a crime
and wars of aggression in violation of International
Law and Treaties, as another crime, then any and all
Invasions, regjirdless of purpose, intention or cffjct, would
bj criminal, whereas, wars would be criminal only in the
event they wei't; aggressive, and in violation of
International Laws and Ti'eatius, anid if it is sug
gested that the phrase, "of aggression and in viola
tion of Intornafclonal Laws and Treaties" applies to invasions as
-18-
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well as to wars, we are confronted v;ith
the obvious proposition that thc;re are no such things
. as invasions in violation of International uaw and
Treaties, there arc no treaties by v/hich the nations
have agreed to abandon invasions and no jDossible basis
for the claim that an invasion without v/ar was con
trary to International Law prior to tho adoption of
Law 10.
As to wars, there may — and Indeed there seems
to be -- a difference of opinion as to whether initia
ting a war of aggression was a crime under International
Laiv, when the wars here involvc-d were started, but at
least there is substantial basis for such a claim in
view of the fact that some 63 nations, had joined in
announcing the principle, and in a covenant to the
effect that they would not resort to war as an instru
ment of National policy, and thab Germany was a party
to that covenant.
There is nothing of that sort so far as mere
invasions are concerned,
(7) Furtheimoro, it is very difficult to under
stand how any act can properly be described as a Crime
against Peace, which docs not constitute a breach of
the peace, ktio are sometliucs inclined to talk about
the "crime of aggression", wnoi-caa the Statute speaks-
of "crijiies against peace". Confusion rusults. Neither
the Statute nor the Tre^:.ti33 on which it is based con
demn aggression. It condemns wax- for the purpose of ag-
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grcssion. acts may be aggressive that are short of
war. Tney may merit the condemnation of all right-
thinking people, but unless they involve a breach of
the peace, it woula be an abuse of language to call thciii
"Crimes against Peace".
P'or all of tho foregoing reasons, X have
reached tho conclusion that what happened in Austria
and Czechoslovakia, whoru tns troops of Germany marched
in, but there was no disturbance of the peace, and no
war, does not constitute a Crime against 'Poacc.
WHEK IS TEE ChXiViE AGAIl'ST PEACE COUPLETL?
In view of the claim made in the Opinion that
all those v/ho participated in a v/ar of aggression know
ingly, are guilty of Crimes against Peace, considGration
must be given to the question of what the crime is, and
when it is complete. In other words, aru those who par
ticipated in a war, alter it has coi!ir,.onccd, cither on
the economic, diplomatic or military front, or in any
other way, guilty of Crimes against Peace.*'
The Prosecution, in its Brief, contends that
the word "waging" as used in the otatute, means partic
ipation in the war in a substantial manner. The Opinion
gives no explanation as to the reason for its conclusion
that such participation is a Crime against Peace.
I do not believe that a correct interpretation
of the word "waging" as used in Bav/ 10, leads to the
conclusion that participation in the war, after it has
commenced, is a Crime against Peace., .according to Law
10, the Crime against Peace consists in "initiating" a
war of aggression. The terms "planning", "preparation"
-2 0-
V"waging" are only means by which the war is gotten
into motion.
The Prosecution, in its brief, takes the posi
tion that the v/ord "waging", as used in the Statute,
means something entirely different from "preparation",
"planning" and "initiation". The principle of ojusdem
generis, on the other hand, would suggest that it has
^ somewhat similar meaning, or is at least related to
the previous words.
ahcn the Statute provides that "waging" "is
included in "initiation" it must, is seems to me, be
given sucn meaning as relates it to initiations. ' '
This is clearly stated in Uaw 10. If w^.s not
so clear under tht, teriiis of the Charter, and yet it
was given such moaning by the IwT tvon under the
Charter.
it has been claimed that there is some language
in the ILT judgment decided undor uhc provisions of the
London Charter with reference to hcenitz, which
appears to support a contrary viev/. If so, it is of
minor Importance in view of the numerous and definite
expressions in that judgment, even as it relates to
Loenitz, which shov/ a contr^Lry view.
ifor example, at tne very outset of the discus
sion of "The Comiaon rlan of Oonspipacy and ^iggresslve
/
war", the Tribunal, after saying trnit war was an essen-
tlally evil thing, states;
"To inxtiato a war of aggression, therefore.
Is not only international crime. It is
the suprarae international crir^.e."
-21-
A review of tho fr.cts stated by the IMT to
support a conviction of waging an aggressive v»?ar,
reveals that the emphasis is all placed upon v/ha.t
the dei'cndant did oeforc the war started, not after-
wa rd.
For example, in the c^.se of G-ocrint?, the
Luftwaffe which he commanded, and which raised havoc
during the vjar, is hardly mentioned in connection
with Crimes against loace committed by him. The sub
stance of his acts, which support, his conviction, is
contained in the last paragraph of the Tribunal's slim
ming up for Goering as follows:
"After his own admissions to this Tribunal,
from tho positions which he held, tho con
ference he attended and the public words
he uttered, there can remain no doubt that
Goering was the moving force for aggressive
war, second only to Hitler. He v.'as the
planner, and prime mover in the military
and diplomatic preparations for war which
Germany pursued."
In like manner, an examination of the facts
st-^.ted by that Tribunal, to establish f^ullt of other
defendants, shows that the emphasis and the facts
which led to a conviction were activities of the
defendants in bringing about the war, not in fight
ing it, or in participating in it in any way after
it came into existence.
Even in the case of Docnitz, a careful examina
tion of the case against him, as str.tcd by tho Tribunal,
will show that it was v;ha.t ho did before hostilities
actually broke out, and in reviving them after they were
in fact over, that led to his conviction.
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iii'ter stating the things that Docnitz did not
do, the Triounal makes this statement:
"Docnitz did, however, wage aggressive v;ar
within the meaning of that word ns "usod hy
the Charter; subnarino warfare v-^hich began
immediately upon the outbreak of the war
was fully coordinated Vifith the other branches
of the Vi/ehrmacht, It is clear that his
U-boats, few in number at the time, were
fully prepared to wago war." (Emphasis added)
Then, aft er further statements concerning the
influential positions of Doenitz, occurs this very
significant statement:
"As late as A.pril 1945, Yjhen he admits ho
knevv' the struggle was hopeless, Docnitz,
as Commandor-in-Ghicf, urged the Navy to
continue its fight. On the 1st of May,
1945, ho bcca.me t}K. Hoad of State, and,
as such, ordered the '>ehrmacht to continue
Its war in the East until capitulation on
the 9th of May, 1945."
This is the final fact statud by the Tribunal
In the case against i^oealtz, and it must have been
regarded by the Tribunal as of the highest importance.
Its obvious purpose is to sbov/ that,even after the
war, which bcgm in 1939, was in fact over, Doenitz
ordered further and continued attacks, if this state
ment serves any purpose, it is to show that he, in
effect, by what he did, initiated a now war, or
revived one.v/hlch v;as already over, i
• • If '"waging" in the sense of fighting a war,
or merely participating In a war, was sufficient to
establish his guilt, why was it necessary to refer
to this fact in order to connect him with the initia
tion of a new war, or the extension of a war already
in existence, after it was, in fact, over?
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This, it seems to mo, clonrly demonstrr.tos
tbp.t, in the opinion of ths.t Tribunp.l, sonetbing
more. thA:n participating in a \vr.r ?^lready initiated
was necessary to estciblish waging witbin the meaning
of Law 10,
This conclusion becomes even more imperativo
yNhon it is considered that Docnltz commanded the-sub
marines and thr.t these submarines vjrought terrific
damage and destruction all during the course of the
war* Yot this fact is not even mentioned in connec
tion with Crimes against icaco. If waging war, in
the ordinary sense of participating in the war, con
stituted guilt, these facts would establish it ocyond
peradventui-e or doubt. It wouia -i:,ve oeen wholly
unnecessary to refer to the fact that be had his sub
marines ready -and in a position to strike in advance
of the actual outbreak of the v/ar and that be revived
the war after it was otherwise over, and to base their
judgment on these facts*
The Prosecution cites some authorities which I
think support the view that the word "waging" referred
to in Law 10 docs not mean participation in the war
after It is started.
For example, Justice Jackson is quoted as saying
the follovang:
'•Our first task is to examine the means by
vJhlGh these defendants and their fallow con
spirators,prepared and incited Germany to
go to war."
It is oovious that statement must have been made
in the trial before the IMT'. irofessor ^ecbsler
-24-
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is also qiiotea as saying this;
"I'he greatest evil Is, of course, the
initiation of war itself. Once the
evil of war hns been precipitated.,
nothing remains but the fragile effort
embodiod for the most part in the con
ventions, to lixnlt the cruelty by which
it is conducted."
I'his clearly shows that the initiation is
thoup-ht to be the crime, and the. b, so far as pe.rtici'
pation is concorned, nothing ror-mins bub the conven
tions to govern it.
Joreovci*, whore a statute codifies pre
existing law, it is customary to look to the pre-
t
existing law as an aid to interpretation, Tno situ
ation is not unlike that oxisting where the common
law is in effect. if?cquently a legislature will
abolish common law crimes, for example, and then
enact a Statute defixiing a crime briefly which
existed at common law. It is the universal prac
tice in such instances to look to the common Is-w
definition of the crime to aid in tho construction
of the Statute.
Here we have a onc-soiitcncc definition of an
International Crime which was said to exist under
Intcrnatlcnal Lav^r before the definition was adopted.
For a iiiorj vjxaot definition, especially on a
point which may not bo clear, v/e c-rtalnly have a
right to look to wnat constltu! .a tint crime under
International haw, as it exlstcu prior to'the adop
tion of th^; Statute, especially v/nere, as here, it
was the intention to adopt a description of a crime
previously e:jclsting.
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The reason why wars of aggression were held
to he a crime against International Law, prior to
Law 10, Was because to start such a war ?;ould be to
violate the Kellogg-3rland Pact, under which the
Nations agreed to abandon war as an instrument of
National policy, and other Treaties of the same gen
eral purport. Under that Pact, what v;ould be the
crime and when v/ould it be complete ?
If the Treaty prohibited the use of war as an
instrument of National Policy, it seems obvious that
the Pact would be breached when the nation resorted
to a war of aggression or to serve any other National
policy, hn agreement not to rosort to war as an
instrument of National Policy is breached only b:^
resorting to war, and th. brerach is complete when
war has begun.
The offense, then, under this pre-existing
International Law, would consist in creating a con
dition of war. Tiiore Is nothing In that Treaty, or
in any of the other Treaties of similar purport,
which makes it a crime to participate in a wur after
it comes into 6Xistence»
when a Nation finds Itself at war, and its
very existence is at stake, tixero is nothing in any
of thorjo Treaties which even remotely suggests that
It would be a crime for the' citizens of either coun
try, under these oonditlons, to participate in the
war and to wage war to the limit, so long as they conform to
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ithe conventions in the conduct of war. So when vife consider
the hackground of the Statute, and the reasons advanced tr
support the findings of the BIT, that is but a re-enactment
of pre-existing International Law, we are forced to the
conclusion that those who participated in the war, after it
has been started, even with knowledge of the true character
of the war, are not guilty of waging a v;ar of aggression.
Finally, there is a concD.uslve reason why it must
be said that those v/ho associate themselves v/lth a war, .
after it is started, cannot, on that account, be guilty,
and that is the very language of the Lav/ 10, It defines
the crime as:
"Initiation of i^'.^msions of other coimtries
and wars of aggression in violatiw^n of inter
national laws and treaties,-' etOo
When the Statute says irir".tiaticn is the crime, v/hat right
do we have to say that participation is also a crln.e?
The word "v/aging", as used in the Statute, is re
ferred to by the IMT as participation in a plan to v/age
vmr. It refers to the preliminary procedure up to and
including the outbreak of v;ar, not the participation in
the war, after it has been initiated,
PEFSOhS CAPABLE OF CGMi'-'ITTIBG CHIj/IES AGAINST PEACE
One further legal question must be considered here.
We have already called attention to the statement of the
IM" that it ic the initiation of wars of aggression, whioh
are the supreme orir^es. V® have called attention to the
fact that under the law existing prior to the London
Charter, or Law 10, the offense would consist in resort
ing to war as an Instrument of national policy,
-27-
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\i<L have called attention to th- v/orklng of
Law 10, which described Crlmos against f's..acc as the
initiation of invasions of other countries and
wars of aggressiOxi, etc.
The question th^n arises, "V,hat action, and
by w^hon, may be said to constitute the crime of
initiating a war of aggression?" The question of
whether or not a nation will wage an aggi'essive war
is a question of national policy. Obviously not
everybody in the natioa is in a position to participate
in th-: formulation of such a policy. Vihat-evcr
many of thom do, as.indi\iduuls, is so devoid of
significance or effect that it would be wholly
unrealistic to say that tnoy wcri- s factor in deter
mining the policy to wage an aggressive war and
therefore guilty of initiating a war of aggression.
The IMT, in its judgment concerning the defend
ants who were convicted, lays emphasis nob only on
their attitude -and partlcipation in a plan to 'wage a
war of aggression but also on the relation of such
defendant to hitler and the opportunities they had
and the capacity they had to influence hatioiial pol
icy tlirough hitl-r.
The comments of that Tritunal are equally sig
nificant with reference to some of tho dof^.-ndants who
were acquitted.
For example, take tho case of Fritzsche# Ho
not only drllvcr^d tho hally Paroles to tho Press,
which directed the propaganda campaign in the Press, and
-28-
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which wore obviously very important in conditioning
the minds of the German people for v/ar, but ho subse-
(^cntly delivered radio addresses. These he apparently
prepared himself, yet the Tribunal held him not guilty.
It did not even go into tho question as to whether he
know of a plan to v/are a war of aggression.- It speaks
of FritzshS'tJs lack of position and influonco in tho
Third Koich, and the further fact that he had never
had a conversation with Hitler. It thus appears that
position and influence, and standing with Hitler,
v;er0 thought to bo important, in order to play a
part in initiating a war.
Of course, more proximity to Hitler, such as
a secretary or-adjutant v/ould have, would not" be
controlling. But in viov/ of the power Hitler had,
It is a factor in determining whether a person partic
ipated in tho initiation of n war or not. To
participate, requires, in addition, a position of
pov;er and influence, and the use of it, for -the pur
pose of initiating a war, knowing the war will be one
of aggression.
There is another thing about the holding as to
Pritzschc that is significant. The Tribunal said he
was but a conduit for the transmission of tho D'^ily
Paroles, and that he prepared and formulated dally
radio Paroles "according to tho general political
policies of the regime*.
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1'his suggests fchr.t people v/ho are in r. sub-
crdlnr.tc position, find who merely cr.rry out tasks
assigned them, according to the generrl political
policies of the Nazi rcgir. e, arc not in the class
of people v.'ho can be said to have knowingly and
v/ilfully participated in a plan to wage a war of
aggression, suggests a auostantial limitation
on those who may properly oe said to have committed
crimes apiainst peace*
The Tribunal in the P^rbon case in considering
this question said in substance that the lilT had
placed the dividing lino just bclcv: the policy-making
level. In other vvords, only those persons who were on
a policy-making level could be liable for the commis
sion of crimes against peace.
•'"hiE statement was reaffirmed, at least in
principle, in the Krupp case, and again in the High
Command case. These holdings arc rcrsuaslvc and I
think they arc correct.
""ho then are the pc-oplc on the poxic^-making
level'.'
A comprehensive definition will not be attempted
This much may, howrvrr, be said on the subject. Only
those arc included, regardless of title or official
position, who, by reason of their position of povyer,
arc able to exercise,,as a. matter of free choice Influ
ence on ihc govornmcntrl policy, so far as the
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question of p-.oing to wr.r or rofr^.ining from going to
war is concorncd. The attitude or actions of others
would bo v/ithout significance or effect, and they
could not, therefore, bo said to have been a party to
the initiation of a war. As to each defendant, -chere-
forc, we must seeic tne answer to the roxiov;ing three
questions:
(1) Did be knowinp'ly engap-c in some activity
in support of a plan or purpose to induce
his government -to initiate a v/ar?
/
(2) Did he know that the war to be initiated
was to be n v/ar of aggression?
(3) ?i/as his position and influence, or tho
consequences of bis activity si\ch that
his action could properly be said to
have had some Influence or .effect in
bringing about the initiation of the
war on the part of his government?
Only if all or tnese questions are ansv/ered
in' the affirmative will ¥/e be justified in finding a
Crime acrainst i'acc has boon commltte'^.
It appears without question that t^c wars in
connection with v/hich some of the defendants in this
case have been convicted v/cre wars of aggression. It
vjas so found by the IMT, and there is no occasion to
discuss that question further. There la, as previously
Indicr.tod, a question as to v/hether there v/cas any
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aggressive war In Austria and Czechoslovrkla, whcro
German troops marched into the country. But this
question tas previously been discussed. There remains,
therefore, for consideration, only the question as to
whether the evidence establishes the guilt of the
defendants according to the tests above outlined.
It seems to me unfortunate that the opinion
quotes a statement of the I?vfr vhich v^as made with
reference to the Conspiracy Count. The Defense in
that case had argued that there could not be a com
mon plan or conspiracy in a Dictator'ship, because the
Dictator alone made the plans.
The Tribunal, In dealing with this question,
in effect snid, with reference to those vjho were
fully advised of Bitler's plans and purpose, that
those with knowledge of his plans, who gave him
their aid, were liable. The statement, standing
alone, and without reference to the context, and
the fact that a common plan or ocnspiracy was under*
discussion wbcn the statement was made, is mislead
ing.
In the f5.rst place, it must be borne in mind
that Hitler*s plsn therein referred to v;as the common
plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive war -- a plan
which the IMT hold must bo concreto and definite and
not too far removod from the time of action. Also
the "aid" referred to was to help bring the plan
into realization by the initiation of the war
involved in the plan. It does not include the per
formance of the normal functions of a civil servant*
Obviously, that statement cannot properly and
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litero.lly -be applied to anyone cnai-ged in this Count.
I'his IS not a conspiracy Count. I'ue Conspiracy
Count, which is COUKT I'-.O, has been dismissed and it ^
has thereby been ndjudicated t>-at the defendants were
not parties to any common plan or conspiracy. What
the defendants are charged with is what the IR-IT called,
"waging." -^'hat is participation In a plan or a pur
pose to initiate a v/ar, knowing that it was to be a
war of aggression.
YiTSIZSAECICSR
Vi/EIZSAECKER is convicted because of his alleged
participation in the initiation of the invasion cf
Czechoslovakia, or that part of Czechoslovakia which
remained after the Sudotcnland had oeen ctded, and
Slovakia had declared its independence.
In my view, he Is not '^uilty for tv '^O reasons.
One, the inve.vsion of Czech cslc.vrkia v^as not a Crime
against Icace, because there was no war, and no dis- *
turbancQ of the peace. Two, he took no part in bring
ing about or Initiating such a,n invasion.
The first proposition has already been dis
cussed, I turn to the second.
The Opinion states in substance that iIjEIZSaEOKEK
did not originate the invasion, a.nd forcible incorpora
tion of Hohemln nnd Moravia, and that wo do not believe
he locked upon the project with favor.
In spite of this concession, ho is convicted.
The Opinion states, in substance, that altheUi^h the
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defendant WKIZSAECKS^ was not present at the Confer
ences where Hitler announced plans of aggression, he
became familiar with them from reliable sources, i.e.,
Hibbentrop, Canaris, leading generals of the Cbhrmacht
and others, who furnished him with accurate informa
tion.
lhat is the first I have heard in this case of
any such claim and, so far as X am aware, there is no
evidence to support i\;. It is true, of course, that
received some information as to what was
actually going on, which.may not have been generally
available, but it has not been suggested heretofore,
tiiat he received information vtrith reference to these
conferences, where the corrimon plan and conspiracy to
wage an aggressive war v;ero formed.
It is significant that on such an important mat
ter no evidence is cited or referred to in support
of the statement. Si^=nlficantly, it appears elsewhere
in the opinion that nniiilZSALCiliXi was not in nibbentrop's
confidence and that they did not get along very well.
It is my judgment, based on the evidence in
this case, that '.^LIZSAbCiuit *S knowledge of planned,
future developments in the field oi x'oreign Policy,
as it affected war, was limited to inferences which
he was able to draw from what was going on about him.
This was consistent with the^secrecy regulations,
which were rigorously enforced in the neich, and
which provided that no one should be told of what was
being done or planned with reference to matters of
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this sort, except whrt r>n official nip-ht be toli whet
was necessary for him to knov; in order to perform his
duties. But only so much vjas to be told as it was
necessary for him to know, and not that until the
time came when he must know,
tor example, V/EIZSAECICER was not told of the
planned invasion of Denmark and Norway until about'
three days before the invasion occurred, and after
the German troops bad departed, and was told then
only because it was necessary for the Foreign office
to prepare and communicate a stat-wrnent to oe delivered
to the Danish and Norwegian governments.
Now what IS the evidence on wl'.ich the Opinion
relics to convict i''/FIoSAFC^''EK which indicates that he
aided In the Initiation of the invasion of Czechoslo
vakia? '^'Jhat he did before the marching in of the
German troops, according to the Opinion, is the fol
lowing.
He received a memo from itibocntrop of an
interview with Hitler I'hich' had to do ivlth the rela
tions with Hungary. It does net indicate that Hitler
had any intentions of military action against
Czechoslovakia. The balance of the evidence consists
of memos of interviews v.dth representatives of r'orcign
Governments^ such as Britain, Irance, It-aly and ozecho-
Slovakia., concernxng a guor^.nty, whlcn Germany had
agreed to a-lve in the Munich Agrconent.
In ^11 of these, interview^ 'i'/ETZS,A^'C''ElR tried to
avoid, excuse and justify th^ failure -^.nd refusal of
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his government to enter into such c gur.rnnty. But v;hr.t
did all of that Inve to do with the invasion v:hich fol-
lov;cd?
If the guaranty had been entered into, 7/ould the
invasion have been less likely to follov;? Hitler v/as
not enbarrassed by Treaty obligations in his other cara-
paigns. V^hat reason is there to suppose that he vvould
have been I'estra.ined by this one, ospecic.ily since the
so-cclled. invasion or niarching in of troops was carried
out in acoord'^nce v/ltb, or as a result of, an agreement
on the part of the Frcsi'^cnt ".nd t^'C Foreign Minister of
Czechoslovakia,
But even more important than tb-'"t, what could
VvFIZSAECICER do about itV He was not in charge of the
Foreign policy of the ^Miich. It was not for him to
decide v/hcther such a guaranty should be entered into
or not. He could not control that. his government
did not want to enter into such a guaranty, he could
not compel it to do so.
It would be vholly unrealistic to supiose that
ViEIZSAFG:''Eh had any control over such matters.
did not make the polxcy. i.e coaici oniyi rc-floot the
facts as to vjhether or not his i-roiei'ni:ient was willing
to enter Into such a crupranty. All be could do, and
all be did '^ o was to make t>u best case in behalf of
his Governncnt thr.t he could, end th^-t does not indl-
catc any purpose or Intention, on his part to encnur-
ago a military assault on Czechoslovakia, nor did it,
in fact, encourage such an assault.
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These interYiews do not appear to have had any
connection whatever with Haoha's visiting Berlin, and
with his suhmit ting to ^Hitler'-s will, and his -opening
the door for the entry of the German Array, nor doeg it
"appear that they were intended to have such purpose.
These interviews did not Initiate, and had no connection
with the initiation of that proceeding, and they are in
no way connected with it.
The Opinion then sets out a number of interviews
with these same Foreign representatives, which ViffilZSAECKER'
held following the absorption of Czechoslovakia, in
which he defended the action v:hich his Government had
taken, and claimed it was the result of an agreement
between the two states, and that other governments had
no grounds for complaint.
The Opinion seems to lay stress upon what' happened
subsequently, and to draw from it the conclusion that
WElZiSAECIiER played a consenting part. There is a sugges
tion also that what WEIZSAECKER did following the absorp
tion of Czechoslovakia, was an implementation of the
enterprise.
'I am unable to support this line of reasoning.
If what happened with reference to Czechoslovakia was
in fact a crime against Peace, lAfEIZSAECKER could be found
Guilty in my judgment, only if he affirmatively did some
thing to initiate the enterprise, a nd did It with the
intention of initiating the enterprise. Evidence of
that sort is entirely lacking.
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The opinion reveals that y*EIZSAIjCKER had played a
heroic part in an effort to preserve decency and peace.
Because he was silent in this instance he is convictod,
although evidence is lacking that ho had advance notice
of Hitler's purpose sufiicient to eno.ble him to attempt
anything effective to prevent it, if indeed, there was
anything he could have done under any circumstance.
but, in my judgment, his failure to" do anything
to prevent the proceedings, even if he had had an op
portunity, cannot be regarded as a crime. He does not
commit a crime against peace in any event, by inaction.
Something affirmative is required.
It is not possible to examine and discuss the
other convictions unu^^r this Count in detail, and no
useful purpose would be served therc;by. It is suf
ficient to say that not in any of then is there any
evidence to show that tne defendnnts did anything
affirmatively to initiate a war, iniowlng it was to
be a war of aggression.
WOERMNN was the head of the political division
in the Foreign Office, and as such, subordinate to
WF-IZSAECKER and to Kibbentrop. He is convicted be
cause of certain diplomatic messages ho sent which
are described in the Opinion. The only ones which
relate to a possible futur'e war are those sent to
Slovakia. They are obviously messages which orig
inated with the H.rmy and have to do with coordinat-
ing military action in case of attack.
The Foreign Office is, of course, the only appro-
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priatc channel of communication between nations. In
transmitting those messages the Foreign Office acted
merely as a transmission line. It is hardly to be
supposed that these messages represent V/OERM^ro*s
plan. Ha was not running the Army, nor planning
military cooperation with Slovakia in case of attack.
It was a proper precautionary measure in any event.
But it was in fact, as we know now, a preparation for
attack on Poland. - But it was disguised as a defense
arrangement. It was so represented to Slovakia, and
there is no reason why WOERM.'»N H should have rdcognizcd
at the time that it was an act of preparation for a
war of aggression against Poland. . But if he had'
recognized it, I do not see what ho could'have done* about
it. He was a subordinate in the Foreign Offico.- The
Foreign Offico v/as available for such communications
regardless of what WOERM/aW ^lay have thought about the
matter, . . .
!
Hone of the other matters cited in the opinion
have a nything to do with initiating the v.'ar against
Poland, Indeed, many of them are concerned wiiih events
happening after the war was over. For instance, there
is a message sent by him stating that a certain Polish
Bishop would not be permitted to return to Poland after
the war. This could have no connection with initiating
that war, in any event. Moreover, the message merely
conveyed the decision of his aovernmcnt. It v/ould be-
wholly unrealistic to suppose that it was up to VvOER-
M/HH to decide whether the return of the Bishop should
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"be pormitted or not".
This and many other like Items of evidenco cited
in the Opinion seem to indicate that the controi-ling
consaderation, sc far as the Opinion is concerned, is
whether or not y in v/hat the defendant did, ho acted in
sympathy with the Rolch program or in opposition to it.
And if It can be found that the things he did are in
harmony with the Keich program, no matter how innocent
tho acts In thomselves may bo, the opinion seems to
hold that he then cooperated vjith or inplomonted such
program. Of course, under such a formula, one may be
held to participate who merely writes a letter or re
ceived one, or forwi\rds a report, no matter hov/ harm
less thoso documents may be in themselves.
in my judgment, the field is not that open. To
bo guilty, - I repeat, - tho defendant must have
participated in the initiation of c war of aggression.
In order to do'that, he must have com^wit ted. some act
intended to have sonio effect in oringing about a war,
knowing it woiild -bo a war of aggrossion. That kind,
of evidence is conspicuous by its absence here.
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KEPFIER
As to I^PPIER, his cictivltles v^ero In Aus
tria, where there was no v/ar, and this, in itself,
in my judgment, is a complete defense to the
charge•
Moreover, there Is no Indication that ho
worked there with a view of initiating a wnr«
His job was to seek a union v^ith Austria by
peaceful means* Since all the political parties
in Austria favored a union, it was not unreason
able to suppose it could bo acccmplishod»
The conditions requisite for such .a union
had already been accomplished pcfore the German
troops entered Austria. A government fav able
to such a program had been cst"bllshed before
the troops moved in.
That KEPFLER did not favor the entry of
the troops is shown by his statement quoted by
the IMT. Vi/hen Gooring telephoned KEPPLER to
have Seyss-Inquart send a telegram requesting
German troops to enter Austria to prevent blood
shed, KEPPI.ER replied:
"vVoll, SA and SS arc marching through
the streets, but everything is quiet."
This Indicates pretty clearly that KEFPLER
did not favor the entry of German troops and that
he believed it unnecessary.
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The Opinion does not cite any facts or
ovidoncc to support the proposition that KEPPIiER
initiated, or helped to initiate, an invasion of
Austriuo His guilt seems to consist in an inter
ference with Austrian affairs» But this is not a
Crime against Peace® .
t r
I . ,,
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'as fco tlie defendants who were convicted be
cause of thein activity in the Pour-Year Plan, it
does not appear that they Imcw that preparation \^s
being made for an aggressive v/a'r. There is no doubt
that the Four-Year Plan, at least in its later stages,
was engaged in preparation for war on a rather largo
sonlo, but every nation engages iu military prepara
tions. Such preparations are as useful for defense
as for aggression.
Hitler, up to the outbreak of the v/ar in 1939,
repeatedly declared that such preparations were for
defense, and there was great emphasis placed on the
danger which confronted Germany from without. Those
who engaged in production of armament and military
prcparntlon aro not liable lanless they do so for the
purpose of preparing for a war of aggrossion. Proof
of this essential fact is lacking.
The same consideration, of course, applies to
other kinds of defense preparations, such as defense
councils and defense committees, and other types of
civil and government organization.
li^MMEHS is hold largely because of bis prep
aration of decrees and other documents for Hitler. The
nature of his v;ork and the liabilities of one who
merely formulates decrees and other o±ficial docu-
mehts, is discussed under COUNT SIX of this separate
'Opinion, It is sufficient here to say that he was,
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in the words of the Prosecution, "Hitler *'s faithful
servant" exorcising clerical and secretarial functions
and drafting decrees as a technician in that field.
Ho was the office chief of Hitler's office, as
Chancellor, and served Hitler in the civilian sector
of Government. Hitler had other offices through
•which he exercised other functions, including mili
tary functions. li'iMRIERS was not concerned with
policy. He exorcised no policy-making functions.
Vi/hlle ho held the title of Minister, it was purely
honorary. He exercised the functions of a State
Secretary. Ho cannot properly "be said to hnve "been
on a policy-making level, or to have exercised any
influence or povjer in the direction of initiating a
war.
In my view, none of the defei:idatits convicted
under this Count can properly be held to have partic
ipated in a plan to wa.ge a war of aggression, or of
exercising any activity v^lth the intention or pur
pose in vlevj of starting or Initiating such a v;ar,
and if such a construction could possibly be placed
on their activities, it docs not appear that they
had any influence or effect in bringing about a
state of war. Neither they nor their activities
appear to have had any influence on Hitler. They
were not the people on whom Hitler relied for guid
ance and support in such matters, and their -actions
were without significance, so far as the initiation
of the war with which they are charged, is concerned.
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•COUNT THREE
COUNT THREE charges the I^efendants therdin -named
with participation in the murder of prisoners of war and
belligerents engaged in the war against Germany.
RITTER
RITTER is allugod to have participated in such
murders because of two incidents, to-wit:
(1) the murder of ^^lliod fliers;
(2) the Sagan murders.
The murder of sillied fliers refers to the lynching of
^..lliod fliers who bailod oUt of their pianos after alleg
edly making machine gun attacks on civilians on the
highways or in the fields, while flying at low altitude.
In the interest of brevity they will bo referred to here
moroly as, "Alliod fliors'^
That such incidents occurred, and thet allied fliers
woro lynched and murdered, and that such acts were inde
fensible murders, la well established. If it be conceded
I '
that these >.llicd flio-rs had mode attacks on civilians as
claimed by the Defense, the remedy was not lynch murders,
Thuy wore entitled to bu taken as prisonurs of war and if
thoy committed war crimes, they were subject to trial and
punishment in cccordanco with the rulus of the Hague and
Gonovd Conventions. There was no excuse- or justification
for murdering thorn.
Our task hero is to determine whether the defendant
RITTER had any criminal rosponsibility for such mudors.
It would seem almost, suporfluoua to suggest in a legal
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opinion that a person to be guilty under this charge must-
have himself murdered prisoners of war or ordered others
to do so, or at least performed some act or non-act which
had a eausal connection'with such murders and was performed
v/ith the intention of causing or assisting in causing such
murders.
RXTTER became attached to the C^erman Government as
a civil servant before the First World War. Ho served first
in the Cclonial Office. He was a soldier during the First
World War. He joined the Foreign Office in 1922. His work
there was mostly in the field of economics and in connection
with oommercial matters. He worUed on reparations after
the First World War, and negotiated many Trade Treaties
subsequently for Germany. He became Ambassador to Brazil
in 1937. He was withdrawn from that position due to Party
opposition. had roaohed retirement age, and asked to
be retired, but was not permitted to do so. He was made
Ambassador for Special Assignments in the Foreign Office. _
After the war broke out he was made liaison offxcor
between Ribbentrop, the Minister, of Foreign Affairs, and
Keitol, the head of the Armed Forces. Ihe functions of
that position arc Indicated by the title. His dob was to
maintain contact or liaison between these two top officers,
and to facilitate communication between thorn. For that
•purpose ho maintained field headquarters not too far removed
from either. He had no authority to determine policy, or to
^^r>f>r.rnlrp- uolicy cither for the Foreign
make any decisions concerning poxi ^
THa nurposo of liaison was to 1® opOffice or for the Army. The purpo
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'• ; ' each informod In matters which ooncorned both and to
facilitate negotiations between them> and to enable the
^wo officers to bettor coordinate their efforts.
It is no doubt true that whore difforencos aroso
ho was free'to make suggestions, and did make suggestions
with a view to enabling the parties to roach, a common
agreement or understanding,
-If On 15 Juno 1944 RITTSR rccoivod from Kcitol, as
stated in the opinion, a proposed program of procedure
I- concerning the mistreatment of killed fliers, and Loitol
requested the opinion of the Foreign Office v/lth refcr-
. encc thereto. The Foreign Office vjas naturally consulted
^because it would be required to answer protests received
from the protective pov^ers of enemy countries.
This comriunication requested the opinion of the
Foreign Office by the 19th. On the 18th Rlttor telephoned
that the opinion of the p'oreign Office could not be dollv-
orod by the 19th because it would bo necessary to contact
• / »
^ Berlin. On the 25th of the month RITTSR wrote to Keitol's
office, trana.ultting:
"For your preLiminary information, tho draft ,
of a reply to tho Chief of tho Suprumc Command
•f tho -.rmod Forces in ansvjcr to his letter of
the 15th of Juno. The draft has boon submitted
t® the Reich Foreign Minister,
Since the Reich Foreign Minister is av/ay on
travel for sovural days, he was not able, as
yet, to give his approval to the draft."
This draft had RITTFR's nrmo typed,at tho end of
it, and was.obviously prepared in the form of a letter to
bo sent by HITTER, but HITTER drew a lino with a pen through
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his namo and marked it "draft", and wrote a sopa^rate lot-
ter enolosing it, as above stated.
RITTER's conviction is baaed on his alleged author
ship of this draft, or his 1:ransmittal of it to Keitel^s
office. Ohe draft is an oxpert^legal opinion and deals
particularly with thu tjoneva Convention, and the rules
developed thereunder. It bears every ovidonco of having
been prepared by an oxpert in that field. KITTER was not
1 •
suoh an oxport. His specialty was economics. Wo witness
/ I
testified that RITTSR prepared it. He testified that he
did not. The circumstances all confirm his statonont.
Theno-^is the circumstance that he tolephonud that
the attitude of the E'orolgn Office could not be trans
mitted until he oontnctod Berlin. There is the long delay
in'forrnuiating the Foreign Office opinion. There Is the
fact that Roitcl asked for the Foruign Officers opinion,
and thc.furthvr fact that the draft did contain the Foreign
Office's opinion, as Ribbontrop's subsequent approval shows.
There is nothing whatever In the aviSonco to suggest thct
RITTER prepared it.
The opinion relics wholly upon the fact that it
board a stamp of having boon in his office, but th^t
oiroumstanco proves nothing as to where it was prepared.
Thcro was no claim in the trial or in the argumunt that
the markings, or rbsonco of markings on the draft had
signlficanco. It appeerfi for the first time in tho opinion.
under such circumstances it is a pretty slender road on
Which to hang a conviction.
It is true that the draft, although making several ••
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•bjootions basocl on- International Lavj, docs rocito that
tlio Poroign Office agrees in principle, but as will here
after appear, Ribbontrop had already ,agreed in principle,
Ihis fact was unknown to, HITTER and this Is another cir
cumstance which Indicates that Ribbontrop's office pre
pared the draft, or that it was done under pre-ttj'' close
supervision by Rlbbontrop, and that HITTER did not pre
pare it. It seems to mo that the finding that RITTER
prepared the draft is contrary to the cvidonoc.
The Important thing, however, is that nothing
came of th^ draft. It had no consequoncc whatever.
RlTTER^s communication to Keltel's office,gave notice
that Hibbcntrop's approval was subject to Hitler's
approvcalj and that he would not give his final approval
until Hitler had approved.
It further appears, without dispute, that Sonn-
Icltncr, of Rlbbontrop's office, was to present the matter
to Hitler, This olroumstanco suggests that he may have
had something to do with tho proparatlon of the draft.
In any event when it wa-.s presented to Hitler, Hitler said
it was "nonsense", apcordlng to Rlbbontrop's testimony
before the IMT, and nothing vjas cvur done about it. It
never wont into effect. IT® orders wore over issued
because of-it. it could not possibly, under any oircura-
stancos, bo the cause of th^ murder of .llied fliurs,
' »
There is anothur ciroumatance which shows that 1
hitter teok no part in the forviiulation of any policy with
rcfcrenGO to Allied fliers. On the 28th of ;iay, Jodl
asked Hitter about the radio campaign then being put on
by Goobbols, with reference to those Allied fliers, and
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what was propar to be dono to resist thorn, HITTER replied
that ho "should apply to a legal expert". \
s . .
The manner in which this policy of lynching of
Allied fliers was initiatod and dovoloped is clearly
shovirn in thu 'evidence, and it clearly appears that RITTER
had nothing whatever to do with it. The IiIT, in its judg-
1
mont concerning Borniann stated:
"Bormann is responsible for the lynching of
Allied airmen. On the 30th of May, 1944, ho
prohibited any police action or criminal pro-^
coodlngs against persons who had taken part
in the lynching of Allied fliers, ^hls was
accoinpanlod by a. Goebbols propaganda campaign
inciting the German pocplc to take action of
this nature and tho conforenco of the 6th of
Juno, 1944, vtfhoro regulations for the applica
tion of lynching wore discussed."
' Tho same Tribunal, in its judgment against Hibbon-
trop stated:
"von Hibbentrop part'iclpatod in a mooting
Juno 6, 1944, at which it was agreed to start
a program under v^hich Allied avi: tors, carry
ing out machine gun attacks on civilian popu
lation, should bo lynched.
This conference was hold with Eitlor at Hitler*?
headquarters, and Kcitel and Jodl of tho Armud Forces,
as won as Rlbbontrop, wore „In attondance. This oloarly
domonstratos thut th. Porylgn Office,or rather Rlbbontrop,
tho Foreign Minis tor, had agrood to this general policy
on the 6th of Juno, at a oonforoncu which Koitol also at-
• tended, so that vhon Koitol addrossod tho communication
t. Rlbbontrop on Juno 15th, it «as not t. sook his opinion
about tho gonoral'policy> but'rather tho details of a pro
gram to put tho policy into uffwct, -.nd thiS involves
toohnlcal procedures upon which RITTSR obviously was not
qualified to act, and did not attempt to act.
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On th.e 4th of Julyj Hitler issued the following
directive:
"Aoc«rding to press reports the /^ngla-iimerleans
intend to subject to air attaohs, small locali-'
ties without any war, economic or military
value,as a reprisal against V-1. In the event
this report proves true, the Fuehrer orders that
notices be served by v;ay of radio and the press
that every enemy aviator who is•shot down while
participating In such an attack^ is not entitled
to treatment rs a prisoner of Yi?ar, but that he
will be killed as soon as he falls into German
hands. This rule shall apply'to all attacks on
small localities which constitute neither mili
tary targets nor communication targets, etc.;
and are, therefore, of no military significance.''
As stated in the opinion this order was actually
put into effect and became the official policy.
It will be noted that-this statement of Hitler's
provides ho machinery of any kind for determining whether
Allied fliers who bailed out had attacked civilians or
n®n-milltary objects, and it contains no definition of
"non-military" objects. The inevitable result was to
ma^ke all bailed-out fliers subject to : ttack according
to the judgment or opinion of the attaicker.
The opinion of the Foreign Office which HITTER
tra-nsmitted would have been an improvement on this,
but It had no effect. It was declared to be n®nsense
and discarded. This order of Hitler's had its origin
in the Hermann action, and the Conference of the 6th of
June. It was uninfluenced in any v;r.y by any document
which HITTER even touched.
My conclusion Is that HITTER played no part in
this transaction, except the normal function of lic.isonj
that he performed no act, not even of liaison, v>;hich has
u causal connection with the death of any lillied fliers
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and that -what he did, indicates no criminal intention
-whatever, and I am unable to follov/ the reasoning
vjhich leads t© the conclusion, that he is GUILTY of
participating in multiple murders.
SAGLU LfJ-PDERS
STEENGPu'.CET AI-ID HITTER
In connection "with this incident not only RITTER
but also STEENGR^^CHT, who vas then State Secretary in the
Foreign Qffice, are convicted, - HITTER because it is
claimed he helped prepare a diplcraatic note, and
STESHGRAGHT because It is claimed he dispatched it.
It is doubtful if the Indictment charges any
such crime against STEEUGR.CKT, r.fid it Is certain that
it does not against HITTER.
Unfortunately, the Opinion attempts to abstract
rather than to quote what the Indictment charges in
COUMT TI:rES, and by the process of reversing the order
of statement, greatly enlcrgea the scope of the charge.
Vftiat.the Count charges has already been stated in sub
stance, but in visv of the confusion at this point, and
in aid of r. better understanding, it may be well to
quote it verbatim;
SS®iv». otwJ p»=on.. ™ th.S,t.2."i»9 to ao, oo»ltt.d w„ ergot.,SPaSSooa in j-rtiol. "as deline ^participated in atrocities
n?fenLr"JaL.it prisoners of war andSri.. Ot notion.,
mt.-v.ni -Rfilch or ware under the belligerent control
or military occupation by Germany, includingIll treLment, enslavement, brutalities,Ld other inhumane acts. Prisoners oi
"^°:^^fLV?i«erent3 were starved, lynched, brandedwar and belligerents
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shackled^ tortured and murdered In flagrant
violation of the lavi?s and customs of vjar', and
through diplomatic distortion, denial and
fabricated justification, the perpetration of
these offenses and atrocities was concealed
frem the protective powers. The defendants
committed \«ar Crimes in that they were princi
pals In, accesaorlos to, ordered, abetted,
took: a consenting pa.rt in, ^joro connected v;lth
plans and enterprises involving, and were mora-
bors of organizOvtlons and groups connected with,
the commission of YXr Oriraes."
It will bo noticed that what is charged hero is
participation in the murder of prisoners of war and bollig-
eronts of countries at war with Gcrma.ny. f^ll other allega
tions are but moans by vjhich it is claimed the crimes were
committed.
The Indictment is so framed that the first prragraph
of each count charges the crime. In succeeding paragraphs
is stated, by way of a Bill of Particulars, what each defend
ant did t© constitute his guilt of such charge. The legal
sufficiency of such statements in the sub-paragraphs to
sustain the charge Is, of courso, a legal question for the
Tribunal.
Sub-paragraph 28-C is the one which describes the
acts of STEEiTGFLiiCHT and HITTER which it is claimed consti
tute their guilt and the opinion specifically finds them
guilty of the crimus sot forth in said paragraph. It is as
follows :
"28 (o): In March, 1944, approximately fifty
officers of the British Royal ^>ir Eorco, who escaped
from the camp rt Stalag Luft m whore they wore
confined as prisoners of war, vjoro shot on recap
ture. Thu (Gorman Foreign Offico was fully advised
and prepared "cover up" diplomatic notes to the
Protective povjer, Switzerland. Thadden of the
Gorman i-'broign Offico wrote to Hagner, a subordinate
of thu defendant STEKi^'GRt-C*:^, stating that a commun
ication was being sent to Groat Britain via Switz
erland to the effect that, in the courso of a search,
'a number of British and other escaped officers had
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/to bo shot as thoy had not obeyed instructions when
caught". In furtherance of this policy to shoot
escaped prisoners of war upon recapture, th<- defend
ant RITTER, issued a warning notice, disclosing
the creation of so-called ^doath zones* for the
alleged protection of *vital installations* wherein
*all unauthorized persons will be shot on sight*.
A letter from the ^erman Foreign Minister to the
defendant RITTER in July 1944, stated that the
Fuehrer v^fas in agreement with the German Foreign
Office communication to the Swiss Embassy concern
ing the escape of the prisoners of war from Stalag
III, and that ho further agreed to the issuance of
the warning notice and the forvjarding of such a
c©mmunication to the ^wiss Embassy.
It will bo noted that this paragraph does not charge
STEEiJGRixCHT with having done anything. It simply charges
that someone wrote a letter to his subordinate • It charges
RITTER only with having written warning notices of danger
zones, a charge on v/hich, by the opinion/ he is acquitted.
It has been the settled view of those Tribunals that
no defendant should be convicted on a charge not mentioned
in the Bill of Particulars contained in the sub-paragraphs
of the Indictment. Indeed such would have to be the rule if
Indictments are to moan anything. Otnerwiso, RITTER vi/oul
appear to defend under COUNT THREE for having posted warning
notices of danger zones in prisoner of war camps> and
himself convicted of an entirely different charge. That is
what has actually happened.
TRIHJN-X I In Caso I (Doctor's case) stated tho rule
as fallows;
Sln.l IP
for tho follovJlng reason. soou-
• two and throe of its xndio , such a
•Unn fAeeted to frame its pleading ,tion el€ ov^arsio all defendants with the
oSLlon of war ^fm^lo
n '^^ in^arsubilaragraph doalins with medical
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oxporlmonts, only those defondants particularly
charged with responsibility for each particular
item.
"In our view this constitutoel in effect, a Bill
: Particulars, and was, in ossonco, a declara
tion te.tho defondants upon which thoy woro on-
titlod-t® roly in preparing their defenses, that
•nly such persons as woro actually named in the
designated oxporimonts would bo calie d upon to
defend against tho spocific items. Included in
the list of names of those defendants specifi
cally charged with responsibility for the malaria
oxporimonts, the name of ROSE does not appear
"Wo think it would bo manifestly unfair to tho
defendant to find him guilty of an offense with
which tho Indictment affirmatively indicated ho
was not charged."
If wo are to follow this rule,.- and thoro is no
reason why wo should not, - thoro should, on that account,
bo no conviction here as to either STEEITGFL'.CET or RITTER,
and ospecially not RITTER.
But, passing that, tho evidonco does not warrant
a conviction in any caso.
It is probably unnocossary to say more about tho
facts than appears in the. Opinion, in order to demonstrate
that neither STEENGRi^CHT nor RITTER is shown to be guilty
of participation in tho murdor of those unfortunate Brit
ish prisoners of war who had escaped from prison. But
boforo approaching that question, some correction and sup-
plomontation of the facts sooms appropriate, it vi/ill then
appear, I.think, that thoy are not guilty of anything.
Complaint is made in the Opinion as to the notes
sent to Switzerland as protective power for Great Britain.
Both woro introduced as rebuttal documents (Exhibit C-372)
which, when considered in connection with the absence of a
specific charge against STEEI^GR/.GHT and the complete absence of
a charge against RITTER with reference thereto, raises a fur
ther question as to the propriety of considering them
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In connection with a substantive, affirmative charge against
thei» defendants.
on 26 May, the German Foreign Office received an
inquiry from the Swiss government, as protective power
for Great Britain, about the reported death ef British
prisoners of war who had escaped from a prison camp in
March, preceding. It was HITTER*s task, as liaison man with
the Armed Forces, to investigate this matter. Q?here is no
indication that he had ever heard of it before receiving
this assignment.
Keitel denied any knowledge of the matter, but gave
some indication that these prisoners had escaped from
prison camp and were captured by the police. HITTER then
contacted the police and was furnished perfect records,
showing these men were shot while resisting arrest.
AXbreoht, the head of the legal division of the Foreign
Office, had been summoned by Hlbbentrop from Berlin to Salz
burg, where Rlbbentrop maintained his headquarters, to prepare
a reply to this Inquiry from the Swiss government. RITTER
i thought these records of the police were a "swindle" and so
advised Rlbbentrop and Albrecht. He told the police the same
f thing, and they did not resist the Idea very strongly.
1 Albrecht prepared the reply note. The opinion con
victs RITTSR largely because Albrecht says he prepared the
note after talking to RITTER. Of course he talked to RITTER.
He would hardly prepare the note at Rlbbentrop-e Invitation
without talking to the man who Investigated the facts. There,
is no claim that RITTER deceived him. He could not report
anything more than what had been reported to him. He told
Albrecht What the police reported, and also that he thought
It was a swindle. V<-hat more could he do? And after the
note was prepared, both Albrecht and RITTER advised Rlbbentrop
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not to send it. Ribbentrop,. of course, as Foreign
Minister, completely controlled "wliat note, if any, should
be sent. HITTER had no control over that.
\Yhat Ribbentrop did with it, and whether or not he
sent it, and whether or not the no to in evidence which ap-^
parently came from tho British Foreign Office files vi/as
the one Albrecht prepared, does not appear. But, assuming
that it was sent, and that the copy in evidence is a true
i
copy of what Albrecht prepared, RITTER has committed no
crime.
Vlfhether or not STEENGRACHT dispatched the note at
Ribbentrop*s orders, or had anything to do v/ith it, does
not satisfactorily appear. No names are attached to the
notes in evidence. But if ho did send it, as the opinion
states, it was by order of Ribbentrop and without any
knovjledge as to its incorrect statements. At least the
evidence fails to show ho had any knowledge that it con
tained incorrect statements.
( As to the second note it does not appear that
RITTER had anything to do with that. STEENGRACHT has some
^ recollection of it. But it was obviously a high policy
matter for which Hitler and Ribbentrop were responsible.
At least it does not appear that STEEHGRiiCHT prepared it
or dispatched it. The opinion seems to take tho view
that because ha stated ho had no clear recollection of
it, that such statement is evidence that ho did send it.
It thus appears that neither RITTER nor STEENGRACHT
had any part in a deliberate fabrication of a falsehood to
be sent in a diplomatic note to Great Britain. STEENGRi-.CHT
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had nothing to do with the preparation of the note and
was not informed as to its incorrectness when at the
direction of the Foreign Minister, he dispatched it,
if he did dispatch it.
HITTER reported truthfully and fully as to the
facts revealed in his investigation, i^lbrecht prepared
the note. Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, controlled
the matter of sending it after being fully advised as to
the facts as was possible at the time.
But even if it be conceded arguendo, that RITTER
and STEENG-RRCKT deliberately and intentionally played a
part in sending a false note, the crime would not be par
ticipating in the murder of the British prisoners of war,
which took place some two months before they ever heard
of it.
It later came to light, and is now known, that
Hitler issued a direct order to the police to run.down
these escaped prisoners of v/ar and kill them. There is
no suggestion in the evidence that RITTER or STSENGRixCIIT
knew this at the time these notes were prepared and dis
patched, or that they had any other information than that
contained in the note prepared by ii.lbrecht at Salzburg.
I am unable to follow the reasoning which leads
to the conclusion that STEENGRi-.CHT and RITTER are guilty
of narticipating in murders which occurred two months be
fore they heard of them, or took any action with reference
to them.
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VJhat has heretofore been said in the discussion of
the case against HITTER and his alleged participation in
the murder of ^..llied fliers, is equally applicable to other
defendants so charged in Count Throo, including the defend
ant Li-ILlhRS. He is charged, because of a letter he wrote
to the ilinlstor of Justice on June 4th, transmitting the
^ circular decree of Bormann dated liay oOth.
^ In transmitting this decree E'lJiSHS ivUs performing
the normal functions of the Chancellory. It was a sort
of secretariat vhich served the Chancellor much as any
secretarial orgc.nizatlon would serve thu liead of a govern
ment- It was the proper avenue through which approaches
wore made to the Chancellor, and was the viechanism designed
to distribute comirunioatlons of all Hinds from the Chancellor
to the Ministries or other agencies of government,
t LiilljhHS, as ho^-.d of the secretarial organization
known as the Chancellory, had no right to decide what he
would or would not distribute, he had no choice in the
matter. in performin,; that puruly clerical or ministerial
task, he could hardly be chr.rged with criminal intent in
any situation. Ho gave no ordurs, and of course, had no
authority to do so. He did call attention to the rospoot
in which the docroe mir;ht bo applicable to the operations
of the Ministry of Justice.
If the ivlinisti^'- of Justice- did anything as a result,
it was done because of tliu decree of Bormann, not because
(
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of IiklvH'ffiiRS's letter transmitting it.
But the conclusive circumstance that LuMIviSRS'
letter, even if it led to the dismissal of prosecutions
of people who had engaged in Ij^nching (and there is no
evidence that it did) could not have thereby encouraged
future lynchings, is the fact that the police had al
ready been prohibited "from interfering with lynchings,
and this "was accompanied by a radio campt-ign. (See
quotation from IMT, supra) The dismissals, therefore,
if there were any> wero the result of c~ public policy of
authorizing lynchings, not the cause of it. It can
hardly be claimed that the letter had any causal connec
tion with the lynchings which had already taken place.
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BERaER
BERG-ER is. convicted of participation In the murder of
the French General, Hesny, a prisoner- of war. That General
I'lesny V7as brutally murdered in reprisal or revenge for the
elleged shooting by the French maquis of a Germa.n Genera.1,
and that this was done on direct order of Hitler, given to
Keitel, there can be no doubt. Our task is to determine
whether or not defendant BEKGER had a.ny criminal responsi
bility for the crime.
BERGSH held many positions in the SS. He was Lieuten
ant General in the SS and the Waffen-SS; liaison officer
between the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Reichs Minister for
the occupied Eastern territories; Cha»J8.f of the political
dii'ecting staff of the Reich I^iinister for the occupying
Eastern territories; Supreme Military Commander in Slovakia
in 1944, and Chief of the PoatE.1 Censorship, He obviously
could not devote all of his time to any one of them. In
addition to these tasks, he was made Chief of Prisoner of
War Affairs under Hiramler, and subordinate in th"t function
not only to Hlmmler but to Keitel, and of coursey Hitler
as well.
The office had previously existed under that same
name, Chief of Prisoner of War Affairs, in the organization
of the Army, BERGER, upon his appointment, assumed thcit
"tiitle so that the terra Chief of Prisoner of 'War Affairs,
fflay refer to the agency or to the person of BERGER, and
is important to know in every case in which sense it
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is used. In the documents which the opinion cites, the
agency is referred to because the evidence shows, without
dispute, that BERGEH did not sign any of these documents.
some of them were signed by Meurcr, who was his Chlef-of-
Staff in prisoner of W0.r affairs, and in charge
office, and who was in the habit of signing BERGSR'S
name to documents involving the agency.
Meurer was a witness for the Prosecution and
conceded tliese facts.
BERGEH bega.n ta.]£ing over tne agency on Ocooo
and had completed a considerable portion of the task by
October 23rd, but the oomplote take-over did not oake
place until about the middle of Hovombor. "^hen BERGER
took over the agency, he took over the personnel of the
agency with him. These were all Wehrmacht men who be
longed to the Armed Forces under Keitel.
BERGER-s first knowledge of the proposal to exe-
0„t. . Prenol, Gen.r.l, o.«e to 1.1. tro. Kootor 1»
H„„.bor. Iloorer, ao a Pro.oootion ,lt».=., tootlflod
to BERGER's reactions as follovjs:
•B. aoaaitlei
nfcasi wou?a he agree to
the matter carried out.
Further, in cross-examination, he testified.
"Vihen the written 11^^0011 not have
spontaneously '^^^y^^'^^yehatlort; he also
carried out an order of ' ntact Himmler
'^ ftter Ca' irnfctssa?y?°would contacton this matter,
the Fuehrer hlmseli-
i-b.t he did attempt to contactThe evidence shows tha
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Hitler, but that Hitler would not receive him. Before
he was able to contact Himmler, BERG-ER was injured,
early in the month of November, as a result of being
buried alive in debris in a bombing raid, and was con
fined to the hospital for at least tv/o weeks.
Upen his return from the hospital he inquired of
Meurer what, if anything, had been done about the matter,
and learned that there ha-d been no further developments.
^ He went to Southwest Germany to see Himmler at Friberg.
and finally contacted him at Ulm, and after muca diffi-
culty had an interview with Himmler, in which he protest-
ed against this procedure, and apparently Himmler gave
him some encouragement to believe that it would oe aban
doned, and VTTote him a Christmas letter vrhich seemed to
contain such assurance.
Early in January, BERGER had to leave on a business
trip and before leaving told Heurer to keep a sharp look
out and to let him knov;. Apparently, he had some appre
hension at the time that the matter was being revived.j
• V/hile BERGSR vras away, and on the 19th of January, tnis
murder took place. It was accomplished by SS men in Wehr-
f macht uniforms, while transferring some French Generals
from one camp to another.
The Opinion puts great stress upon the fact that
some of the men in the group were subordinates of BERGER
in the agency. Chief of Prisoner of iar Affs-irs, but
ttiere isn't a suggestion in the evidence that tney acted
upon any order of BERGER's. It must be remembered that
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while these men were suhordlnate to BERG-ER, they were
also subordinate to Keitel and to Himmler, as was
BERGER himself, and that they would naturally act in
accordance with orders originating from that source
regardless of whether they had BERGER's permission
or not»
An unfortunate error seems to have crept into
the opinion^ It quotes BERGER as saying to Meurer, when
i'leurer reported to him on sending in the three names,
that BERGER approved of Keurer's action sa.ying;
"because, after all, there are no
possibilities left."
This statement, given as a direct quote from BERGER,
would indicate that BERGER had given up the struggle
and vras determined to make no further resistance, but
this also is not the record. The witness Meurer testi
fied as follows:
"I informed him of the changes that mean
while occurred, and ho approved my measure?,
because affer all, there were no other pos
sibilities left to me."
^ (Transcript 2375)
This conveys quite a different meaning, and does
I not suggest that BERGER had given up the struggle. The
facts appear to be, even as related by the Prosecution
witness Meurer, that BERGER did nothing in the way of
participating in this scheme to murder a French general;
that, on the contrary, he did everything he could do to
prevent the carrying out of such a scheme, even to the
point of advising his office chief that he would have
nothing to do with it.
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The attit'ude of BERGER to the execution of this
ordei' to have a French General shot, is fully sho\m
by the testimony to be one of opposition, and as effec
tive opposition as it, was possible for him to exert.
His attitude is further shov/n by the fact that
almost immediately thereafter he heard that Hitler
planned to hold as hostages, certain prominent English
prisoners of war, v7ho v/ere connected with the Royal fam-
^ and BERGER promptly had these prisoners of war
• moved to a point in Germany near the Swiss border, and
from there, on his order, they were taken into Switzer
land and BERGER declared at the time that it was being
done to "prevent a second Mesny affair". He went to the
- extent of violating Hitler's order, to put prisoners
of war beyond the reach of anyone v;ho sought to carry
out another murder like the Mesny affair.
BERGER's conviction seems to rest uprn the propo
sition that he was unable and unsuccessful in preventing
Hitler, Keitel and Himmler from carrying out this enter
prise. They v;ere his superiors. Many lives have been
lost by efforts to prevent these men from carrying out
their will. The lav; imposes upon BERGER no such obli
gation. He did expose himself to danger in his opposi
tion, and he did nothing affirmative to aid the action.
I am unable to see any legal basis for the conviction
of BERGER In connection with this unfortunate murder.
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iCOUNT FIVE
COUIW FIVE charges the defendants therein named
with war crimes and crlmos against hximanityi.
"in that they participated in atrocities and
offenses, including murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, kill
ing of hostages, torture, persecutions on
political, racial and religious grounds, and
other inhumane and criminal acts against
German nationals and members of the civilian
populations of countries and territories under
the belligerent occupation of, or otherwise
controlled by Germany, plunder of public and
private property, wanton destruction of cities,
tovms and villages, and devastation not justi
fied by military necessity,"
The opinion contains a lengthy discussion prelim
inary to the question of guilt of individual defendants.
It seems necessary to refer to it only briefly*
In my judgment, it Is incorrect to say that all
of the German people, except a fe¥/, participated in the
persecution of the Jews, and it is incorrect to say that
the Foreign Office knew of exterminations of the Jewish
people, especially if by the term, "Foreign Office", it
is intended to imply that the Foreign Office defendants
^ here had such knov/ledgo. The evidence, in my opinion,
> falls far short of supporting any such a conclusion.
A
It is incorrect also, it seems to me, to assume
iij' that every reference to the "final solution" of the
I
Jewish question means extermination. The fact Is that
when the first campaigns against the Jews were Inaugurated,
the term, "final solution" came into use. Generally in
the early stages, the final solution meant fcreed emigra
tion, During one period It meant deporting the Jews tj
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Madagascar, As a res\ilt ot the Wannsee Conference, it
meant deporting them to labor camps in the East. It never
meant extermination, except to a few of the initiated,
I'he evidence shov/s that tie pron-rcm of extermination
v;as handled with the greatest of secrecy. Hitler orally
instructed and directed Limmler to start tuis action; liimnuer
carerully selected and pledged to secrecy the men who were to
work with him and to carry out these extierminations; places
were selected which v/err isolated, and were comonflacred by
%
being identified with labor camps nearby, and the proi^ram
r was carried on with the deliberate purpose and desi.gn of pre
venting the German people, and all others not connected with
enterprise, from knowing vjhat was going on. The evidence
by those who v/ere on tie inside of this terrible extermina
tion program strongly tends to show that not over 100 people
in all were informed about the matter,
This is rather eloquently Illustrated by the case of
Fritzsche, F'ritzsche was a responsible official in the
Fropaganda Ministry. He gathered news for the press and
made nev/s broadcasts over the radio; his whole activity v/as
to discover the news and know wnat v^as going on, and yet the
f I^fT found that he did not knov; about these exterminations.
He testified in that case that he had heard rumors;,
that he had asked Goebbcls about the matter and that Ooebbels
informed him that it was just foreign propaganda, Under
V such circumstances, I do not believe it can be
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assumed, even thoup^h rumors may have been heard,
that the defendants in the Foreign Office, or any-
other of the defend<ants, had kno^'-ledgc of these
exterminations at the time they were occurring,
or at any ti. e material uere, "J-he eviaence cer
tainly fails to shovJ it beyond a rersonable doubt.
Of coursf., they all knovr of them and the vorld
knows of them.
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VvEISSAHiCJiiER Ai'C) vvOi^HilvIAKN
TliG discussion in the Opinion concer-ning
.^iilZSAEGiSER and Vj^OERIvI/iNN, in COUNT FIVE, v.hich
deals with the persecution of' the Jews, is a long
one. It reveals all of the details of those hor
rors. I fear it gives the impri^ssion ,that the
Foreign office v/as the principal agency for the
execution of such policies. The method of presen
tation should not prevent a calm and logical analy
sis of the entire matter. The situation deri:ands, for
a just solution, reason and judgment, not emotion.
I havv^ discussed sorie of the evidence with
roference to kncwlodge of tins J'oreign Office
defendants of the uxtormination of Jews, to soiriO
extent in connection v/ith another defendant. I
will not repeat it her^, but will uxpoct vdnat is
said on that subject in connection Vv'ith the Foreign
Office defendants to apply to all.
Something additional, however, must be said
here. The nanaling of the so-called . Jev/ish question
was vested by hitler ex.clusively in hirmoler and his
SS, The limited field in which jii'IilZSAECiCEiR and hOLRfclANN
might exercise a veto, on proposed Jewish measures,
will be later discussed. i»vith roforenco to the
question of knowledge on the part of ABIZSnZCi'JiL-i
and wOEHihUTJ, the Opinion cites the entire record
of the Jewish persecutions. These .
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persecutions increased in intensity as the years went by.
ioc torminations, did not become a significant part of the
program until about the middlb ' of 1942 and laost of the
exterminations took place during the last two years of
the war.
ihe Opinion cites the hinsatzgruppen reports as
charg?,rig .•iihXZSi--ECiChd and with knowledge of them.
These reports arc those of the SS units engaged in behind-
tho-line activities in hussia, and as a part of the war
against iiussia. But that war did not start until Jure ,
1941. Btrangc t.s it niay seom, the incidents on which
vvE,IZSjr^ECj:lBR and i.-OERi'liKK are convicted, are events Vihich
happened in June or July, 1942, before they are shown 'to
have had notice of these horrible things having happen
ed, so that obviously, WhlZSAECICBR and could not
be charged with having noted with K:iiov;ledge of such events.
leoreover, it must be romeiabereo that both
and WOhHi;UhN left uermany in 1943. J^oth were demoted by
Riooontrop. '.'i/LIZS.j.hGK£H v.^as sent to the. Vatican, -and
•jiiOERlvl/xdlT to China, so at the time the worst persecutions
took place, th^y were-not even in the, country.
Opinion cites the testimony of vvhJZS.^ECiffih son. •
It fails to shov/ that ViiEIZSAECKER had knov:ledge of any syste
matic exterminations at any time. it shows only that he
know oi Individual deaths, and that he could not understand
them, nut even mortj iniportaut than that, there is no time
fixed in the. son's testimony as to when his father heard of
these deaths, whether a-f; thu beginning, in the middle, or
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at tho end of the war. The testimony of the son quoted Is
worthless on that account.
There is nothing to impeaoh WEIZSAECKER'S testimony
about v/hat he know. Certainly it is not impeached by
the kind of facts referred to in tho Opinion. Moreover,
it is indicated in the Opinion that YJEIZSAECKER has some
responsibility for what was done by Luthcr and Rndemacher
of the Poroign Office, whoso activities are extensively
quoted in tho Opinion.
Ribbentrop testified before tne IMT tnat he set
up a department in tho Foreign Office to carry out Party
programs. That was tho Department, "G-crmany" or "Deutsch-
land". It was directly subordinate to Ribbentrop,
reported to him and received its instructions from him.
Neither VvEIZSAECKER nor WCERMiANN had anything to do with
it.
Vi/lth some of these Irrolovancios out of the v^ray, what
was the picture? Vlien the first action against Jews in
Germany began, and Jev/s were required to register their
property, the Foreign Office recoivod many protests from
Foreign Governments based on the grounds that Jev/ish
Nationals of those governments residing in Germany were
required to register their property. VffilZSAECr^h Immed
iately conferred v/lth the governmental department that
was handling Jev/ish matters, and succeeded-in having all
lows of Foreign Nationality rollevod of this requirement,
and an exception made in their favor. Later-tbe general
exception seems to have been lost, as pressure against the
Jev/s increased, but the Foreign office as roprosentod by
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WEIZSAECKER /-xND WOERMA.M, continued to insist that it be con
sulted whenever any action against Jews of foreign nationality
was cqntemplatod. The object, of course, viras to enable the
Foreign Office to satisfy the reasonable demands of foreign
governments, and to cultivate good relations with such for
eign governments, and to prevent anything from happening which
would produce bad international relations• This wes a matter
of forcisn relations or forcia:n politics which wr^s their par
ticular responsibility and gave thorn a right to be heard,
^ and that ri^t was accorded thorn. Thus, when it was proposed
to deport Jews from Holland, the Foreign Office was consult-
^ ed, WEIZSAECKER objected that since Sweden was the protective
power for Holland, it v/ould not only have the right to object
but the right to inspect the places vjhero those people wore
housed, and that if It were discovered that thoy . had been
removed from Holland, the results v/ould not bo good so far
as the relations v^ith Sweden v;ere concerned.
Vihen It came to the proposal to deport Jews from
Prance, WEIZSAECKER objected vigorously to the deportation
of Jev/s of American nationality on the groiand that such
of American nationals would lead to bad inter
national relations vrith America, Fe could not object on
^ that ground to the deportation of other Jews of foreign
nationality, because the governments of nations of which
they were nationals, had agreed to their deportation. But
this action of I'-EIZSAECKER'S v/as overruled by Ribbentrop,
and American Jews were deported«
When it came to deporting French and stateless
Jews, a deportation for which wEIZSAEGl^R and \/OERIvlANN
are convicted, the Foreign Office had no legitimate
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grounds to object. France agreed to the deportations,
the Jews were stateless. No grounds, thorefoi-o, based
on foreign politics existed for objection. I'heir con
sent meant no more than that. If bEIZSAECKLK'S objec
tion made on good grounds concerning AmericTi Jevrs, v/as
to bo overruled, v^hat possible grounds could bo urged
against the deportation of these French and stateless
Jews so far as foreign politics were concerned? So the
so-called consent of .EIZSAECKEK and of WOERMANN was
^ merely the recognition of a fact thati- conditions woro ab
sent vi^hich gave them a right to object on the grounds •of
^ foreign politics. But the Opinion seems to hold, espec
ially as to WEXZSAECKER, that even in such a situation,
he should have taken advantage of the opportunity to
deliver a lecture to Ribbentrop on International La\/ and
on morality,
such a sentiment fails, it seems to me, to appre
ciate the realities of the situation prevailing in the Reich,
and the personality of Ribbentrop. was in the habit of
doing the lecturing. For nn underling who he had recently
overruled, to attempt to lecture him, certainly wo\ild have
done no good, and it might have done a lot of harm. Il*
^ MIZSAECKER could not prevent Ribbentrop from deporting
Jews of American nationality, on the ground that it might
disturb international relations, how could ho expect to
interest him in non-deportation of Jews on grounds of gen
eral morality? But I do not see how either of "these men
can he convicted for such an ovcrsi^-t in any event, and
failure to preach morality is not a crime, - at least not
one charged in the Indictment, or provided lor in Control
Coiincil Law 10.
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iI am unable to grasp the significance of the other
incificnt cited against ^rJEIZSAECFER concernin/? employees
of diplomatic corps. I understand that the terroa "Diplo
matic Corps" includes all people employed by the govern
ment, Virhich maintains the mission, and for the purpose
of carrying out the functions of the mission. The dis
pute has reference to people personally employed by such
members, as for instance, household help in their homes.
If m.y interpretation is correct, it seems to me
that Vi/EIZ.S/.ECI®R *s opinion v/as correct. But whether it
was or not, there is nothing to indicate that it was.not
^ given in good faith, and honest. A mistake in the inter-
prctction or application of the law, fortunately, is not
a crime,
. I sec no justification for holding h'EIZSAECKER or
•'GERMAN'''^ guilty of persecution of the Jews in connection
V7ith the matters recited in the Opinion. The deportation
of these Jews was in the hands of the SS or the occupying
forces in Prance, The Foreign Office, as represented by
WEIZSAEGKER and 'AOERI/AWN, had a limited right of objec
tion as to Jews of Foreign nationality. They seem to
have exorcised that right wherever it was available,
^ V.here it v/as not a vailable, they had no grounds for ob-
jcction. That is the oxtent of their consent, to con
vict them, is to punish them for the acts of another
I
department of government, which they did not order, and
which they were powerlt-ss to prevent.
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STEPNGhAOHT is chargod in sub-pr;rngr-".ph 42 of
the Indictment;
"42. Innocent members of the civilian
population of the occupied countries not con
nected with any acts against the occupying
power were taken as hostages and, v/ithout
benefit of investigation or trial, vjere sum
marily deported, hanged or shot. These inno
cent victims V7erc executed or deported at
arbitrarily established ratios for attacks
by person or persons unknown, on German
installations and German personnel in the
occupied territory. In many cases the
recommendation and approval of the German
Foreign Office with the participation of
STEP:NGP(ACHT and others were required
prior to the exec.itibn of ticse measures
and the necessary aiploiriatic 'cove,r-up'
was effected to cunceal txie naLuro ui tiese
crimes•"
"48, -> Since by far t^^c p-renter fart of
the victims of this gcnocidal prnprr"" wore
nationals of puppet anct satellite countries
dominated by the 'fhird neich, the German
J'orexgn Office, through the defendants •J'-a
STELNCtIJ!.uKT(and others) foi'ced these
governments to deport persons of Jewish
extraction within treir countries to
German extermination camps in the East,
and directed and controlled the execu
tion of these measures,
It will be observed that in the first paragraph
STEMGFiACKT is charged with .approving deportations and
in the second with forcinp deportations.
A.re.ading of the Opinion reveals that STEi^i^GiUibiiT
is not convicted on either of these o;rounds, and that
the reason for his conviction is r.-motc from any state
ment contained in tne oiil oi iarticuiars against him.
As previously pointed out, it is my view that
Iri'-Uctments should mean something and t^at no defendant
should be convicted except upon a charge contf-ined in
the bill of tarticulara.
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But that iaside, the things on vhich STEBNGiiAGKT
is convicted do not, In my opinion, constitute a crime
against humanity at all, tor that reason it seems to
me unnecessary to go into, the question of v;hether all
of the findings of fact contained in the opinion are
justified.
Assuming that they art: justified by the evidence,
no crime against hur.ianity appears.
iivhat appears in the facts, as found by the
Tribunal, is the following:
(1) 'fhat on hih""ientrop' s order, ST'^ '^^ ^ '^^ rACFT
organized an office-for anti-J^^^'ish
action abroad;
(2) That a card index of Jows abroad was pre
pared and presented to him;
(3) That a memorandum v;a.s presented to him
recomr ending violent action against- the
Jews in lud-pest; that he referred this
.to the hinister at B-ud-pest, who disapproved
it, and nothing came of the matter. Tne
subsequent action against Jews in i;)udap6st
"had no connection with SThhiiCriiiiCxiT', and is
not ciaitri.ed to have nad;
(4) j-e advised the Svedish Ihvoy that he v;as not
competent to de-l -Oanish questions.
Eg was legally correct, '^he opinion sug
gests he should have shcvm sympathy.
(5) Severra reports and memorandums wert. pre
pared in the Foreign Office, one with
reference to the deport;: tlon of Jews in
Greece, particularly in the Salonika area,
but this appears to have exempted JQv/s of
for6i,an nationality, "^hose governments
had not consented to the deportation,
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, and this was the only competency that
STEEhGltACHT, or the Eoreif^n Office, had
In the Jevrish question;
(6) There v^as extensive ccrreEpondGnce had and
memoranda and reports made in an eriort to
permit some JgVi/ish cxii-Ldren to eaixsrate.
The original request was to permit them to
emic^r'te to ialcstine. This could not be
ione under the German policy prevailing at
the time. The German Government vjas court
ing tie Arabs; the Mtjfti of Jerusalem v/as
in Germany. Germany hoped to make contact
vjxth the Arab world and to conclude an
alliance with it, and did not want to risk
displeasing the Arabs by sending Jews to
ialestlne. '• '^his was a high-level decision
which STELMGKAC^ T did not make and could
not violate. There v/ere some negotiations
with a view of having them taken to Jingland
and various reports -nu meinoranda wero pre
pared on the subject until iLibbentrop
stopred the whole business,
(7) STK"R^^GF;AC''-''T wired l^ri^atlon at Bucharest
to make an effort to ave the ^'•umanlan
Government cancel its permit for the Jews
to emigrate to lalestlne, in order to bring
its policy in accordance with the German
policy.
It is transactions of this type that are the
basis of the conviction of STEANCtLACBT, and particularly
negotiations concerning permissions to emigrate. The
opinion, after describing tlese documrnts, states In the
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two final parorrrphs, tie conclusions with reference
to them as foiiows;
'•It would be difficult to conceive of a more
flarrant had faith than tb^^t vhicb was car
ried out in these nep-otiptiuns . "ere at
least is one (^ccas ionwhere Eibhentrop, as
Foreign Minister, asked for advice of bis
Foreign Office. Here was the opportunity
for the Foreign Office and its State Secre-
. ' tary to give good advice instead of bad; to
point out hov; the improvement in German for
eign relations and its rehabilitation in the
eyes of the world would be possible by at
least permitting children to be saved from
extermination; but every step which the For
eign Office took, every recommendation that
it\ia.de, was directed to block efforts made1* "by leading countries, of the v/orld, neutral
as v/ell as anemy states, to permit little
^ children to come unto them and to defeat the
efforts of the good Snmaritans, and turn
their offers into Ihasi pr opr.g.anda . "
( ' "STEINGKACFT was a party to this; he must
bear the responsibility- He should be and
fs held GHIITX under COWT ElVE.'*
Ihls snowii i-rttty clearly tnat sa'l,r,iiviruiCi:iT' S guilt
consists in nis lailurt to rtf..d a moral lecture to
Kibbcntror. It is unnoceEsarv to sreculate as to 'ffhe-
tbcr or not be sboulci bcve Hone so, rnH wbat the effect
would have been if he had. It, Is only necessary to
point out that his failure to do so is not a Crime
against Humanity charged in tl e Indictment and defined
in Control Council -^ow 10,
The opinion in this, and in the case of other
^ defendants in this Count, seems to me to ignore the
definition of Crimes against Eumanity as cont..ined
the la w, and to proceed upon the theory that anything
which a defendant may have done, which fails to meet
the personal apfrovd of the v,rlter of the opinion, as
to wh.at constitutes proper oonauct, is uCrime ag..inst
humanity.
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